In over thirty two years practicing law, Mr. Hogan has extensive experience litigating in both state and federal court. He has handled a wide variety of litigation matters including trusts and estates litigation, commercial contracts, partnership, shareholder and franchise disputes, securities and fraud cases, business torts, real estate and construction matters, intellectual property and trade secret litigation, aviation, aerospace and product liability litigation, insurance coverage, bad faith and lawyer malpractice defense. Of particular note, Mr. Hogan has counseled and successfully defended major corporations in several mass tort, multi-jurisdictional cases.
Before joining Lurie, Zepeda Schmalz & Hogan, Mr. Hogan was a partner in the litigation department of Bryan Cave LLP, an international law firm now numbering approximately 800 lawyers, where he practiced for fifteen years. During his last three years with Bryan Cave LLP, Mr. Hogan was one of two litigation co-coordinators for Bryan Cave LLP’s three California offices, and was responsible for the administration of the litigation department.
Mr. Hogan graduated at the top ten percent of his class from the University of Southern California, earning his Juris Doctor degree, and Order of the Coif, in June 1978. (Mr. Hogan received his B.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles in June 1975, graduating Magna Cum Laude. He is also a member of Phi Beta Kappa.) He is admitted to practice before all state and federal courts in California, the Third and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Hogan is also a member of the Los Angeles County Bar Association. Mr. Hogan is “av” rated by Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating obtainable. He has also been named repeatedly by Los Angeles Magazine as one of Los Angeles’ Super Lawyers. Mr Hogan is the President Emeritus for the Beverly Hills Estate Planning Council.
View Mr. Hogan’s Representative Cases
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A. In Re: Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 – Mr. Hogan was the partner-in-charge for McDonnell Douglas Corporation (“MDC”) of all litigation arising out of the United Airlines DC-10 crash at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989. Of the 296 persons on board the aircraft, 112 died and 184 survived. There were hundreds of lawsuits filed in many different jurisdictions around the county. Mr. Hogan counseled MDC at the NTSB hearings and directed the defense and settlement of these actions on behalf of MDC. This action involves complicated product liability and negligence issues concerning the design of the DC-10′s hydraulic system, engine design and containment, aircraft maintenance, pilot performance, and “crashworthiness”. The litigation also presented significant choice of law problems and damages issues. All federal actions were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (Chicago) by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and designated as MDL No. 817, In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. 1989) 128 F.R.D. 131. Judge Suzanne B. Conlon was in charge of all federal actions, and rendered several published opinions: In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1990) 133 F.R.D. 515; In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1990) 131 F.R.D. 127; In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1990) 734 F.Supp. 1425; In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1991) 760 F.Supp. 1283; In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1991) 780 F.Supp. 1207; In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 (N.D.Ill. 1991) 781 F.Supp. 1307. All the federal cases settled on the first day of trial, immediately before the impanelment of the jury. The state court actions were filed in states across the country. The bulk of the non-removable state court actions were filed in Cook County, IL; St. Louis, MO.; Baltimore, MD.; Pittsburgh, PA. The actions in Illinois state court resulted in an appeal. See, In Re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City Iowa on July 19, 1989 (1st Dist. 1994) 259 Ill.App.3d 231, 631 N.E.2d 1302. B. Appalachian Insurance Co., et al. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al. – Mr. Hogan represented MDC in this litigation. This was the first case ever filed involving a tort in outer space. The case arose out of the failure of the Westar VI satellite to reach geosynchronous orbit. The failure allegedly was a result of interlaminar density variations in the Hitco manufactured exit cone of a Morton Thiokol Star 48 motor which, in turn, was a major component of MDC’s Payload Assist Module (PAM). The failed launch occurred in February 1984. (Nine months after the misdeployment of the Westar VI, it was recovered in a historic mission by NASA.) Two years later, a lawsuit was instituted by some of Western Union’s insurers, suing in subrogation for negligence and strict liability and seeking $105,000,000 damages. The case involved massive production of documents and numerous depositions. We filed four motions for summary judgment, two of which entirely disposed of the case. Plaintiff’s appealed and we cross-appealed. Mr. Hogan argued the appeal, and the court affirmed judgment in favor of MDC on the basis of the exculpatory clause in the contract for the sale of the PAM-D. See Appalachian Insurance Co., et al. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1, 262 Cal.Rptr. 716. C. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al. – Mr. Hogan represented MDC in litigation arising out of an aircraft accident that occurred at LAX on March 1, 1978. The technical issues involved the design of the landing gear, tires, brakes, wheels, antiskid systems and slide/rafts. The legal issues presented in the case included fraud, breach of contract, strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Summary judgment on the negligence and product liability issues in MDC’s favor was granted in the federal action and affirmed on appeal. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (9th Cir. 1987) 819 F.2d 1519. The case went on trial in state court on the fraud issues, and Mr. Hogan tried the case with two other lawyers in a four month jury trial. Continental prevailed, and MDC appealed. Mr. Hogan participated in the appellate process. See Continental Airlines v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 264 Cal.Rptr. 779. |
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A. Cates Construction, Inc., et al. v. Talbot Partners, et al. – This is a bad faith action in which Mr. Hogan and another lawyer represented TIG Insurance Company (formerly Transamerica Insurance Company). The claimed acts of bad faith arose out of a breach of a performance and payment bond issued by Transamerica Insurance Company to its principal, Cates Construction. The obligee, Talbot Partners, sued Transamerica for bad faith for failing to honor the terms of its performance and payment bonds. Mr. Hogan tried the case with the other lawyer in a one month jury trial. On appeal, the California Supreme Court, in a landmark published decision, held that The court held that, as a matter of law, the developer and the bank could not recover in tort for the surety’s alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the performance bond. A construction performance bond is neither an insurance policy nor a contract otherwise marked by elements of adhesion, public interest, or fiduciary responsibility, such that an extracontractual remedy is necessitated in the interests of social policy. Therefore, the court held that contract remedies provide adequate compensation for breach of the construction bond. a surety cannot be liable to the oblige for insurance bad faith. See, Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28. |
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A. Mr. Hogan represented large insurance holding companies as plaintiffs in a Lanham Act violation, 15 U.S.C. 1125 (false designation of origin, false advertising, etc.). Mr. Hogan successfully prosecuted the complaint and obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant, from running an illegal pyramid scheme which illegally utilized the Plaintiffs insurance companies good name. |
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A. Mr. Hogan successfully represented the plaintiffs in this hotly contested partnership dispute. Plaintiffs and defendants entered into an oral partnership agreement with no specified limit of its duration, to jointly own and operate, as equal partners, a business engaged in marketing and business development seminars. Defendants denied the existence of a partnership. The case settled prior to opening statement on terms favorable to plaintiffs. |
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A. Edward L. Powell, v. Mayflower Contract Services, Inc. – Mr. Hogan was the partner-in-charge of this case for Rockwell, International, which involved a crash of a Blue Bird manufactured bus on Tramway Road in Palm Springs, California on July 31, 1991. There were fifty-three passengers on board the bus, mostly Girl Scouts from around the nation and internationally, and the driver. Rockwell manufactured the brakes, which were alleged to have failed. Other defendants included Mayflower, the operator of the bus; Tramway, the owner of Tramway Road; Blue Bird, the manufacturer of the bus; Dana Corporation, the manufacturer of the axles; and Allison (GM), the manufacturer of the transmission. Over forty-five lawsuits were filed; most were pending in state court in Palm Springs. A global settlement of the actions occurred in 1993 on terms extremely beneficial to Rockwell. Rockwell did not pay any money to any plaintiff or to Blue Bird and received a full indemnity from Blue Bird as to any future litigation that may be initiated against Rockwell arising out of the crash. |
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A. Mr. Hogan represented the defendants in an action that arose out of the performance of an agreement to telemarket mortgage insurance to recent home purchasers. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants misrepresented their experience, resources and capabilities for telemarketing mortgage insurance, fraudulently induced it into entering into the agreement and breached the contract. A settlement was reached and the case was dismissed. B. Mr. Hogan represented Plaintiff, a minority shareholder of a Corporation which owned a motel business in the San Fernando Valley. Plaintiff sued the majority shareholder for breaching the contract whereby he promised to sell all his shares of stock in the Corporation to Plaintiff. Instead, the Defendant took actions on behalf of the motel business to fire Plaintiff as the resident manager, evict him and his family from their home, and cut-off his monthly dividend payments. The lawsuit Mr. Hogan filed on behalf of Plaintiff and against David pled claims for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and involuntary dissolution of the corporation that owns the motel business. Mr. Hogan tried the case for approximately one month. The case settled on terms favorable to Plaintiff after Mr. Hogan completed Plaintiff’s case in chief. C. Mr. Hogan represented Specially Appearing Defendant/Respondent, a Taiwanese company in the trial court and on appeal in an action filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, a Cayman Island company for breach of contract and other torts arising from a contract for the sale of scooters. Defendant moved to quash service of the summons and complaint on the grounds that the California courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action as to the Defendant on the grounds of forum non conveniens (the AMotion@). The court allowed Plainifff the opportunity to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional and forum issues. After Plaintiff completed discovery, a hearing was held and the trial court granted Defendant’s Motion on the grounds that the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it and also on the grounds that California was an inconvenient forum for this litigation. Plaintiff appealed. The Court or Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case as to Defendant based forum non conveniens or lack of personal jurisdiction. |
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A. A.F.B. Associates, Ltd., et. al. v. Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts – Mr. Hogan defended his then law firm in this action for alleged legal malpractice by the partners and associates of the firm named in the caption, above, arising out of Bryan Cave’s previous representation of the plaintiffs in a lease dispute with Alpha Beta. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief concerning their fee dispute with the firm. Bryan Cave filed a cross complaint for collection of legal fees not paid. The case settled on terms favorable to the law firm. B. Benson Ford, Jr. v. Fierstein & Sturman – This lawyer malpractice/fraud action was brought by Benson Ford, Jr., the great grandson of Henry Ford, against Fierstein & Sturman, the law firm which rendered legal advice to Benson Ford, Jr. Mr. Hogan represented Fierstein & Sturman. Fierstein & Sturman filed a cross-complaint for attorney’s fees. Extensive discovery was taken. The case settled immediately prior to empaneling the jury on terms extremely favorable to Fierstein & Sturman. |
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A. Tuneup Masters v. Harlond Hauck, et al. – This securities fraud action began when Tuneup Masters sued Harlond Hauck after Hauck merged his business into Tuneup Masters. Mr. Hogan represented Mr. Hauck, who filed a counterclaim and also initiated a Texas state court fraud action against Tuneup Masters. The issues involved violations of both federal, California and Texas securities and fraud laws. After approximately one year of intensive and discovery litigation in California and Texas, the case settled shortly before trial on terms favorable to our client. |
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A. Mr. Hogan represented two of the grandchildren of a well known oil tycoon in a hotly contested trust litigation. Mr. Hogan prosecuted claims on behalf of the grandchildren against their brother and others for an accounting, surcharge, appointment of successor trustee; ascertainment of beneficiaries and distribution of property on termination of trust; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional misrepresentation; fraudulent concealment; negligent administration of trust funds; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and injunctive relief. Mr. Hogan successfully removed the brother as a co-trustee. One of the central issues in the case was management and control over a star property in Mexico, which was a major trust asset. In December 2004, the matter settled on confidential terms after four lengthy mediation sessions. In 2005, the brother re-filed the case and attempted to rescind the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Hogan filed for summary judgment, and the Court upheld the settlement and granted judgment in favor Mr. Hogan’s clients. The case thereafter settled again under confidential terms. B. Mr. Hogan represented the children of a well known supermarket founder in a trust dispute against their stepmother. The children alleged that their stepmother importuned their father to substantially disinherit them. This trust contest matter involved the classic issues of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence and coercion. The case settled on confidential terms after two lengthy mediation sessions. C. Mr. Hogan currently represents the Respondent against claims by her brothers that she committed financial elder abuse of her parents by allegedly siphoning off millions of dollars from the parents’ trusts while they were alive, but purportedly incapacitated. Her brothers also alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty, removal of Respondent as a trustee and request of an accounting. Trial completed after thirty seven days of testimony on December 21, 2009 and is pending decision D. In a complicated trust dispute, three lawsuits were filed: one in the Los Angeles Superior Court, one in Fauquier County, Virginia, and one in the District of Columbia. Mr. Hogan represented a co-trustee and one of three beneficiaries, against her brother the other co-trustee and a beneficiary of the trust. The issues in this trust dispute involved the development of several parcels of land in Bealeton, Virginia and the management of a partnership which operated an apartment building in Bealeton. Mr. Hogan’s client claimed that her brother mismanaged the development of the land and the apartment building, paid himself exorbitant development fees and reimbursed himself for trust expenses which she claimed were her brother’s living expenses or related to other non-trust businesses which he operated. The parties agreed to mediate the case in Washington, D.C. before a retired judge at JAMS. The case settled after 35 hours of mediation over three days, with the final day’s mediation lasting 18 hours. E. Mr. Hogan represented Respondents, Trustees of an Inter Vivos Trust, established by their father. The Petitioner was Respondents’ father’s second wife and their step mother. The Step Mother filed a Petition for Removal of Respondents as Trustees of the Trust. The Petitioner based her petition on several grounds: (1) that the Trustees have engaged in “bad-faith litigation” against her, as a beneficiary; (2) that Respondents had a conflict of interest; (3) that the Trustees is failed to administer the Trust in good faith. Mr. Hogan tried the case which lasted five court days. F. Mr. Hogan represented Petitioner, the surviving wife, against her stepson, in a trust dispute. The Petitioner alleged that she and her husband, the Decedent, entered into an agreement, whereby each of them agreed to leave to the surviving spouse his/her interest in their family home. After her husband died, the Petitioner discovered that her husband’s trust was not modified. She filed a Petition to recover damages resulting from his breach of his agreement. The claims included breach of contract to make testamentary disposition; breach of marital fiduciary duty; tortious interference with right to inherit and breach of fiduciary duty. The case settled on favorable terms. G. Mr. Hogan represented a wealthy client who was hospitalized by the police at UCLA’s Neuropsychiatric Institute pursuant to Welfare Institutions Code Section 5150. UCLA held a Reese Hearing to force our client to take medication she did not want to take. Mr. Hogan prevailed in that hearing. Our client was than transferred to a private facility. When our client recovered, the private facility refused to release her. We successfully represented our client at a habeas corpus proceeding and obtained her immediate release. |
View Mr. Hogan’s Representative Appellate Cases
I. Federal and Bankruptcy Appeals
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A. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Hogan successfully represented Debtors on an appeal from a final order in a bankruptcy proceeding denying the Debtors’ motion to hold Lender in contempt for violating the discharge injunction by attempting to collect on a debt which the Debtors contended was discharged. Lender defended on the grounds that the Debtor and Lender entered into a new loan agreement, post-discharge, under which the Debtors restructured the loan on their house (the APost Discharge Agreement@). The Debors asserted, however, that the Post Discharge Agreement violated 11 U.S.C. ‘ 524. (Under 11 U.S.C. ‘ 524(c) and (d), a reaffirmation agreement B an Aagreement between the holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable@ B must be filed with, and approved by, the Bankruptcy Court in order to be enforceable.) Since the Post Discharge Agreement resulted in reinstating the Debors personal liability for the debt that was discharged, the Debtors contended that bankruptcy court approval was required under the statute. The issue on appeal was whether new consideration given by Lender pursuant to the Post Discharge Agreement took the agreement outside 11 U.S.C. ‘ 524. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Bankruptcy Court=s Order on the grounds that: (1) 11 U.S.C. ‘ 524 applied to the Post-Discharge Agreement because the consideration given by the Debtors was based at least in part on a discharged debt, thereby bringing that agreement within the purview of 11 U.S.C. ‘ 524; and (2) Lender failed to obtain the approval of the Post Discharge Agreement from the Bankruptcy Court, as is required by Section 524, because that agreement was based, in part, upon a discharged debt. The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court, and subsequently settled on very favorable terms to the Debtors. B. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Hogan represented Debtor on the appeal from a bankruptcy court non-dischargeability judgment against him. The key issue in this case involved a matter of first impression, at the time, in the Ninth Circuit: Do Lee-Bonner vs. Gergely (In re Gergely), 110 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1997) and Resolution Trust Corporation vs. McKendry (In re McKendry), 40 F.3d 331 (10th Cir. 1994) compel the Bankruptcy Court to ignore state statutes of limitations entirely in determining the dischargeability of a debt? The Bankruptcy Court answered in the affirmative, holding “that a debt upon which the state statute of limitations for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, etc., has run prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case has been ‘established’ pre-petition if the creditor has taken a timely affirmative act which is necessary to the creditor’s ability to collect the debt in a manner provided for by law.” In this case, the Bankruptcy Court found that the creditors’ timely filing of the state court breach of contract lawsuit was the necessary affirmative act which established the “debt.” The Bankruptcy Court then recharacterized that contract “debt” as nondischargeable debt under ”523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6), even though the Bankruptcy Court found that state court statute of limitations for all tortious claims had run long before Debtor filed for bankruptcy. Amazingly, the Bankruptcy Court recognized that her interpretation of the law eliminated all state statutes of limitations in bankruptcy proceedings, and noting that A[i]t could be 50 years after the wrongful act, and that the debtor, by seeking relief of this Court, which is a court of equity, is stuck with it and that all bets are off on the statute of limitations, as long as the adversary proceeding is brought within the time period set forth in Rule 4007.” The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. C. Silver Leaf, LLC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. Tasty Fries, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. Mr. Hogan successfully represented Defendant Tasty Fries, Inc. (ATasty Fries@) in the District Court and on an appeal taken by Plaintiff Silver Leaf, LLC (ASilver Leaf@) from the District Court=s denial of Silver Leaf=s motion for a preliminary injunction. The case arose out of a Master Sales and Marketing Agreement (the AAgreement@) worth approximately $100,000,000 entered into between Tasty Fries and Silver Leaf for the marketing and distribution of Tasty Fries french fry vending machines. Shortly after the execution of the Agreement, Silver Leaf began to disintegrate as a vicious dispute concerning organizational control and leadership between its members. As a result of this bitter dispute, Tasty Fries became seriously concerned about Silver Leaf=s ability and willingness to satisfy its obligations under the Agreement. Accordingly, Tasty Fries served Silver Leaf with a request for reasonable assurances pursuant to U.C.C. ‘ 2-609. When Silver Leaf refused to provide such assurances, Tasty Fries threatened to terminate the Agreement. Silver Leaf filed suit against Tasty Fries in order to prevent Tasty Fries from terminating the Agreement and moved for a preliminary injunction. The District Court heard and denied Silver Leaf=s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction seeking to prevent Tasty Fries from terminating the Agreement, finding that Silver Leaf was not reasonably likely to succeed on the merits at trial in light of a Ano suit@ clause in the Agreement in which Silver Leaf expressly waived the right to sue Tasty Fries. Additionally, the District Court ruled that Silver Leaf had failed to demonstrate that its alleged damages could not be adequately compensated by normal contract damages, therefore, Silver Leaf had not demonstrated that it would be irreparably injured. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction. D. In re Original New York Seltzer, a General Partnership, Debtor; Flavurence Corporation, Appellant vs. Duke Salisbury, Chapter 7 Trustee, Appellee. Mr. Hogan represented Flavurence Corporation (AFlavurence@) in this appeal is from a final order denying a creditor=s claim for lost profits caused by the debtor=s breach of two requirement contracts which required the debtor to make minimum product purchases from the creditor, but failed to do so. Flavurence timely asserted two separate claims with Original New York Seltzer=s (AONYS@) Trustee. The first claim was for a $2,400,000 breach of contract and was based upon a 1985 requirements contract entered into by Flavurence and ONYS in which ONYS agreed to make minimum purchases of Flavurence=s product, but failed to do so. The second claim was for $2,300,000 lost profits to Flavurence and was based upon a 1993 requirements contract entered into approximately two weeks before ONYS instituted Chapter 11 proceedings. The lost profits claim stemmed from ONYS= breach of its obligation to make minimum purchases of Flavurence=s product, which both parties to the contract testified ONYS was contractually so obligated. The Court disallowed the breach of contract and lost profits claims. On the breach of contract claim, which was based upon a 1985 requirements contract, the court adopted the interpretation of the Trustee B a stranger to the contract B and disregarded the testimony of the two principals who negotiated and signed the contract for Flavurence and ONYS, respectively, and found that the parties entered into a new contract in 1986, which had no minimum purchase requirements. The effect of this ruling was to eviscerate Flavurence’s claims against ONYS for shortfalls under the 1985 Agreement=s minimum purchase requirements. On Flavurence’s lost profits claim, which was based upon a 1993 requirements contract, the court again adopted the Trustee’s interpretation of the contract and disregarded the testimony of the parties who negotiated and signed this contract specifically finding that their testimony was barred by the parol evidence rule. The court interpreted the 1993 agreement, without regard to the parties harmonious understanding, and found that the contract did not obligate ONYS to purchase any product from Flavurence, let alone a minimum amount. Flavurence appealed the case. The matter was fully briefed and oral argument held. Before the BAP issued a ruling, the case settled on favorable terms. |
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A. Appalachian Insurance Co., et al. vs. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Morton Thiokol, Inc., and HITCO; Lexington Insurance Co., and Talbot, Bird & Co., Inc., et al. vs. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Morton Thiokol, Inc., and HITCO, Mr. Hogan represented McDonnell Douglas Corporation (AMDC@) in this litigation. This was the first case ever filed involving a tort in outer space. The case arose out of the failure of the Westar VI satellite to reach geosynchronous orbit. The failure allegedly was a result of interlaminar density variations in the Hitco manufactured exit cone of a Morton Thiokol Star 48 motor which, in turn, was a major component of MDC’s Payload Assist Module (PAM). The failed launch occurred in February 1984. (Nine months after the misdeployment of the Westar VI, it was recovered in a historic mission by NASA.) Two years later, a lawsuit was instituted by some of Western Union’s insurers, suing in subrogation for negligence and strict liability and seeking $105,000,000 damages. We filed four motions for summary judgment, two of which entirely disposed of the case. Plaintiff’s appealed and we cross-appealed. Mr. Hogan was substantially involved in preparing the appellate briefs, argued the appeal, and the court affirmed judgment in favor of MDC on the basis of the exculpatory clause in the contract for the sale of the PAM-D. See Appalachian Insurance Co., et al. vs. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1, 262 Cal. Rptr. 716. B. Continental Air Lines, Inc. vs. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, et al. And Related Cross Actions, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. C306173; Judge Robert Mallano; Continental Air Lines, Inc. vs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., et al. and Related Actions. Mr. Hogan represented MDC in litigation arising out of an aircraft accident that occurred at LAX on March 1, 1978. The technical issues involved the design of the landing gear, tires, brakes, wheels, antiskid systems and slide/rafts. The legal issues presented in the case included fraud, breach of contract, strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Summary judgment on the negligence and product liability issues in MDC’s favor was granted in the federal action and affirmed on appeal. Mr. Hogan participated in drafting the appellate briefs. Continental Airlines, Inc. vs. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (9th Cir. 1987) 819 F.2d 1519. The case went on trial in state court on the fraud issues, and Mr. Hogan tried the case with two other lawyers in a four month jury trial. Continental prevailed, and MDC appealed. Mr. Hogan participated in drafting the appellate briefs. See Continental Airlines vs. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 264 Cal. Rptr. 779. C. BES Sales (Cayman) Ltd., a Cayman Islands Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs. J.D. COMPONENTS CO., LTD., a Taiwanese Corporation, Specially Appearing Defendant and Respondent. Mr. Hogan represented Specially Appearing Defendant/Respondent J.D. Components Co., Ltd. (AJD@), a Taiwanese company in the trial court and on appeal in an action filed by Plaintiff/Appellant BES Sales (Cayman) Ltd. (ABES@), a Cayman Islands company for breach of contract and other torts arising from a contract for the sale of the famous Razor scooters. JD moved to quash service of the summons and complaint on the grounds that the California courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over JD, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action as to JD on the grounds of forum non conveniens (the AMotion@). The court allowed BES the opportunity to conduct discovery on the jurisdictional and forum issues. After BES completed discovery, a hearing was held and the trial court granted JD=s Motion on the grounds that the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over JD and also on the grounds that California was an inconvenient forum for this litigation. BES appealed. The Court or Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case as to JD based forum non conveniens or lack of personal jurisdiction. D. RELM Wireless Corp., Petitioner vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Respondent. c.p. Allstar Corp., Real Party In Interest. Mr. Hogan successfully represented Specially Appearing Cross-Defendant/Appellant RELM Wireless Corporation (ARELM@) on a Petition for Writ of Mandate to Compel Trial Court to Quash Service of Summons And/or Stay or Dismiss Action and for Temporary Stay of Proceedings in an action filed by Defendant/Cross-Complainant c.p. Allstar Corporation (Ac.p. Allstar@). c.p Allstar, B a Pennsylvania corporation B cross-complained against RELM, a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Florida for indemnification, apportionment of fault, declaratory relief, and express indemnity. The express indemnity claim was based on a contract executed and performed in Pennsylvania with a forum selection clause designating Pennsylvania as the choice of forum. RELM moved to quash service of the summons and cross-complaint on the grounds that RELM was not subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction in the State of California because it lacked minimum contacts with this state, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action as to RELM on the grounds of forum non conveniens because the contract sued upon contained a forum selection clause selecting Pennsylvania as the forum for disputes such as this. The Superior Court denied Relm=s motions: (1) confusing the jurisdictional contacts of RELM=s parent company, with those of RELM. (The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that ownership of a subsidiary doing business in the state does not subject the parent to jurisdiction. Cannon Mfg. Co. vs Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925)) and (2) abusing its discretion by refusing to give effect to a valid forum selection clause. RELM filed the Writ, and the Court of Appeal issued an Order to Show Cause (AOSC@) to the Superior Court as to why RELM=s motions should not be granted. Upon receiving the OSC, c.p. Allstar dismissed RELM from the case. RELM then successfully moved for its attorneys’ fees and costs. E. Jack Rouman, Mary Rouman, Lionel W. Verner, Mary Jane Verner, Cary A. Baldwin, Ralph Irwin and Judith L. Jones vs. Charles E. DaMart and Susan DaMart, Mr. Hogan successfully represented Charles E. DaMart and Susan M. DaMart (the “DaMarts”) on appeal in the above matter. The DaMarts, Appellants, were the assignees of record on a promissory note and deed of trust executed by Respondent Guadalupe C. Lerma (“Lerma”). When Lerma refinanced her property, Lerma and Respondents Western Security Bank (“Western”) and Gateway Title Company (“Gateway”) acting as escrow and escrow sub-agents, respectively, paid DaMarts’ assignor, CML Financial Services, Inc. (“CML”), the balance owing on Lerma’s promissory note. CML thereafter absconded with the pay off proceeds. Subsequently, as a result of the refinancing, Lerma executed a new note and deed of trust on her property, which were assigned to Respondents Jack Rouman, Mary Rouman, Lionel W. Verner, Mary Jane Verner, Cary A. Baldwin, Ralph Irwin and Judith L. Jones (“the Rouman Parties”). The DaMarts commenced foreclosure proceedings, prompting the Rouman Parties to file a Complaint to quiet title, for declaratory relief and for cancellation of the DaMarts’ trust deed. The DaMarts filed a Cross-Complaint to quiet title, for declaratory relief and for negligence and indemnity. Lerma also filed a Cross-Complaint for declaratory relief, indemnity, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The case was bifurcated, with the court first trying the issue of whether CML was the DaMarts’ agent and then trying the issue of whether Gateway and Western were negligent. The trial court held that CML was the agent for the DaMarts and that payment to CML discharged Lerma=s note obligation to the DaMarts. Thereafter, based upon its finding of agency, the Court granted summary adjudication to the Rouman parties and against the DaMarts, enjoined the DaMarts’ foreclosure proceedings, quieted title in favor of the Rouman parties and canceled the deed of trust held by the DaMarts. Finally, at the conclusion of trial, the Court held that Western and Gateway were not negligent in their handling of the pay off of the note. On appeal, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for retrial. F. Patricia Balian vs. Alexander G. Balian, et al., as Trustees, Mr. Hogan represented Capt. Alexander G. Balian, U.S.N. (Ret’d), a co-successor trustees of the Mary J. Balian Revocable Trust dated May 11, 1995 (the “Trust”) in the appeal from the portion of an order granting a declaratory relief petition brought by a trust beneficiary, Patricia Balian, pursuant to Probate Code § 21320 to determine that a proposed petition to modify the irrevocable trust is not a contest. The proposed modification petition sought to strike or modify a “special needs” provision in the trust pursuant to Probate Code §15409. The Court of Appeal ruled in a published decision that Patricia Balian’s proposed petition to modify an irrevocable special needs trust, to eliminate a limitation on distributions which was not necessary to preserve eligibility for any public benefits, was a petition to modify the trust “owing to circumstances not known to the settlor” to avoid impairing the “accomplishment of the purposes of the trust,” and thus the proposed petition did not violate no contest clause as a matter of public policy, regardless of whether the petition was a “direct contest,” where the petition alleged that settlor had been unaware that beneficiary’s Social Security Disability Insurance payments were not need-based. G. Fourth District Court of Appeal, State of California (2009) Mr. Hogan represented a lawyer defending against a Writ of Mandate filed by Petitioners. The Writ of Mandate arose out of the lawyer’s cross complaint for equitable indemnity against Petitioners. Petitioners demurred, and the Court overruled Petitioners demurrer. The Court of Appeal granted an alternative writ. The issue in the appellate court was whether a lawyer who has been sued by a former client for professional negligence can seek equitable indemnity from a lawyer (Petitioners) who subsequently represented the client in the same underlying proceeding – but not in the legal malpractice action. The Court of Appeal, in a matter of first impression, held that public policy barred equitable indemnity under these circumstances. |
Articles Written by Steven L. Hogan:“Representing Clients Held Against Their Will in Mental Hospitals” Seminars/Presentations“The Smart Real Estate Investor’s Seminar: Hidden Real Estate Investment Opportunities in Probate Sales” “Avoiding The Traps and Minimizing The Hassles of Real Estate Probate Sales” “The Smart Real Estate Investor’s Seminar: The Art of Negotiation” |

